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THE new Minister of CoGTA clearly brings to the 
sector fresh energy and a considered approach. It is 
too early to assess whether his approach will make a 
difference. To be honest, so far it does not sound very 
different from previous ministers. Ever since the late 
Minister Shiceka’s 2009 State of Local Government 
Report, CoGTA has excelled at presenting the 
sorry state of affairs of the sector it regulates. The 
presentation of a list of ‘basket cases’ was also done 
by the then Minister of CoGTA, Gordhan, in 2014 
The past few weeks have brought the troubled state of local government to the fore with 
renewed vigour. The Auditor-General’s (AG) consolidated report over the 2016/2017 financial 
year presented a very bleak picture of the local government financial management. The Minister 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), Dr Zweli Mkhize, presented a list of 
municipalities considered dysfunctional and in need of immediate intervention. In the weeks that 
followed, many analysts eagerly joined the chorus and filled social media pages with opinion 
pieces lambasting the poor state of local government. The AG’s assessment was so grim that 
a mere reproduction of the AG’s conclusions was enough to produce blistering opinion pieces. 
Very few appreciated the nuances in the AG’s assessment or analysed the longer term trends 
in audit outcomes (such as the decline of municipalities with the worst audit outcomes). Even 
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when he pronounced that a third of municipalities 
are dysfunctional. CoGTA’s strategies to solve the 
problems are also not a radical break with the past. 
It is a mix of deploying technical expertise in weak 
municipalities, closer monitoring, laced with subtle 
hints of restructuring in the name of financial viability. 
These are the ingredients that local government 
watchers have been getting used to over the past two 
decades. To be clear, these strategies, if implemented 
adequately, may very well help. At the same time, 
they have been part of ‘Project Consolidate’, ‘Siyenza 
Manje’ the ‘Turnaround Strategy’, ‘Back to Basics’ and 
various other local government support programmes 
over last two decades. Perhaps it’s a case of doing 
the same thing but expecting different results.
It is thus time to also discuss new ideas and, 
given the fact that communities are rapidly losing 
patience with municipal failures, there can be no holy 
cows. So let me present a few ideas that I think merit 
further discussion.
The first suggestion is to start an honest 
conversation about the incentive structure for 
councillors. Councillors must provide political 
leadership to municipalities and represent 
communities. There is no doubt that councillors are 
essential to the success of the local government 
system. I often hear the argument that local 
government would be better off without politicians, i.e. 
by removing councillors. This suggestion is deeply 
problematic and ill-considered. Basic service delivery 
and the distribution of local government resources is 
a fundamentally political exercise. It cannot be done 
without local political representation. So councillors 
will and should always remain at the helm of local 
government. However, there are too many councillors 
with intentions that appear to have little to do with 
developmental local government. The ‘political-
administrative interface’, as it is euphemistically 
called, is the Achilles Heel of local government. 
Simply put, it is about local politicians behaving as if 
they are administrators and about local administrators 
behaving like they are councillors. The consequences 
of this blurring of the lines of accountability are 
disastrous. Leaving the quality and calibre of local 
administrators aside for one moment, it leads me to 
this central question about councillors: how many 
were attracted to local government because of the 
prospect of using their influence to make positive 
change, and how many were attracted mainly by the 
prospect of a good salary? The fact is that councillors 
are remunerated well, most certainly in comparison 
with councillors in most other countries, where being 
a councillor is most often an unpaid position. Full-
time councillors (i.e. mayors, members of mayoral 
committees, members of executive committees etc.) 
earn very good salaries. At face value, this makes 
sense as the incumbents have tough and demanding 
jobs. Part-time councillors are also remunerated 
reasonably well. For part-time councillors (who don’t 
occupy any executive office) their remuneration 
ranges from R 230 000 for the smallest municipalities 
to R 480 000 in the largest municipalities. For some 
of you, these may not sound as very large sums of 
money. However, it must be seen in the context of 
the assumption that these are part-time salaries, i.e. 
remuneration over and above an existing income. The 
task of a public representative at local government 
level is hard. Councillors are often the target of 
community anger for anything government fails 
at. For many part-time councillors, their councillor 
allowance is in fact the only income. Let me be 
clear: one cannot but wish financial wellbeing for 
each and every councillor. However, that is not the 
The ‘political-administrative interface’, as it is euphemistically called, is 
the Achilles Heel of local government. The consequences of this blurring 
of the lines of accountability are disastrous.
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point. The point is a different one, namely that the 
substantial remuneration of councillors has added a 
very sharp edge to the contestation over councillor 
nomination. This is borne out by the often violent 
contestation surrounding party nomination processes 
preceding local government elections. Evidence 
presented to the Moerane Commission on the killing 
of councillors in KwaZulu-Natal also bears testimony 
to this. The SABC reported that “[e]vidence before 
the Commission has been that some people see 
being a councillor as a means to gaining income 
and will want to stay in the position at all cost” (@
SABCNewsOnline 26 February 2018). The substantial 
remuneration also fortifies party discipline: falling out 
with the party is about more than an ideological rift: it 
means to risk losing a very precious income. We must 
not ask whether councillors should be remunerated 
more or less. We should rather ask whether the 
current remuneration scheme indeed attracts the right 
calibre of community activists into local government. I 
am not convinced that it does.
The second suggestion is to revisit the way 
executive leadership is structured in municipalities. 
We must revisit the executive mayor model. The 
majority of municipalities are headed by executive 
mayors, who are elected by their councils. Once 
elected, the executive mayor handpicks a number 
of councillors to form a mayoral committee, which 
then assists the mayor. These councillors naturally 
all belong to the same party or coalition as the 
executive mayor. It is therefore a ‘winner-takes-it-
all’ system: parties that don’t govern are not part 
of the executive team. This executive mayor model 
was introduced in 2000. Before then, municipalities 
were governed by inclusive executive committees, 
a collective leadership model in which ruling and 
opposition parties worked together. The executive 
mayor model may have delivered visible leadership, 
direct accountability and efficiency. However, it has 
also delivered many executive mayors who are at 
odds with their caucus, retreat into the municipal 
administration and remain disconnected with their 
base. The collective leadership model offers other 
advantages that we need now more than ever. Let 
me mention two. First, the collective leadership 
model fosters collaboration ‘across the aisle’. Political 
groups that find themselves in opposing camps 
because of ideological (often nationally oriented) 
reasons are brought together to work in the interest 
of service delivery. Secondly, the collective executive 
leadership means that there is more than one party 
and even more than a coalition of parties that has 
direct insight into the municipality’s executive affairs. 
The opposition is included in the executive and there 
are thus ‘more eyes on the till’. This is something that 
will assist in the fight against graft. In my view, there 
is a need to revisit the ‘winner-takes-it-all’ model of 
executive governance in municipalities.
The third, fourth and fifth suggestions are 
for national and provincial governments because 
municipalities are certainly not the only ones to blame 
for the parlous state of local government. One critical 
area is the lack of policy coherence in and between 
national and provincial governments. Municipalities 
are very often at the receiving end of incoherent 
laws, policies and funding streams. This is a result of 
national and provincial departments fighting for turf, 
Municipalities are certainly not the only ones to blame for the parlous 
state of local government. Municipalities are very often at the receiving 
end of incoherent laws, policies and funding streams. This is a result 
of national and provincial departments fighting for turf, or simply not 
coordinating with one another.
The collective leadership model offers other advantages that we need now 
more than ever.
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boldly of the need to empower cities with greater 
authority over housing. In doing so, it echoes the 
National Development Plan. However, the Department 
of Human Settlements will have none of it. It issued 
a moratorium on the accreditation of cities for 
housing. Municipalities, cities in particular, are not 
sure where to turn to or where the centre of power 
on this issue is. The third suggestion, therefore is 
for Cabinet to adopt a mechanism for much more 
effective coordination of laws and policies on local 
government.
A fourth suggestion is for national and provincial 
government to implement the constitutional 
provisions on intervention into failing municipalities 
more robustly. The Constitution anticipates that 
municipalities may fail in delivering basic services, 
passing a budget, paying creditors or governing 
itself in line with basic standards. It provides for 
a comprehensive set of powers for provinces to 
intervene in a municipality when that happens. In fact, 
the Constitution makes it compulsory for provinces 
to intervene if a municipality fails to pass a budget in 
time or is in clear financial crisis. Provinces (except 
KwaZulu-Natal, which intervenes more readily) use 
interventions very sparingly. They certainly don’t 
intervene every time they are compelled to by the 
Constitution. If they do intervene, they often do so 
too late, at a time when the municipality is already 
on its knees and the road to recovery is long, painful 
and uncertain. National government is not off the 
hook here either. If provinces do not intervene when 
they ought to, the Constitution instructs national 
government to intervene instead of the province. 
Again, it doesn’t leave national government a choice. 
or simply not coordinating with one another. One such 
example is the contestation between the National 
Treasury and the CoGTA over the prerogative to 
regulate local government administration. This 
contestation is as old as the local government 
dispensation. While the two departments try hard to 
coordinate their supervision of local government, the 
tension is palpable throughout the local government 
system. What is more, the two departments 
sometimes end up sandwiching municipalities with 
competing laws and initiatives. In 2007, for example, 
the National Treasury issued minimum competences 
and qualifications for senior local government 
officials. Inspired (or irked) by National Treasury’s 
initiative, CoGTA proclaimed its own minimum 
competences and qualifications in 2014, largely 
covering the same senior local government officials. 
At the receiving end of these two overlapping laws 
are municipalities. They have no choice but to comply 
with both and to try to make sense of this awkward 
overlap.
When it comes to laws on disciplining officials, 
things don’t look any better. In 2000, CoGTA 
legislated a Code of Conduct for municipal officials. 
In 2011, this was complemented with detailed 
regulations covering procedures to investigate and 
discipline senior municipal officials. In 2014, the 
National Treasury, perhaps dissatisfied with CoGTA’s 
regulations, doubled up with its own regulations on 
how to investigate and discipline senior municipal 
officials. The two sets of laws have a different 
emphasis but essentially deal with the same issue 
and target the same officials. It’s not easy being a 
municipal manager and having to choose what to 
apply when.
At a broader policy level, there are contradictions 
too. The Integrated Urban Development Framework, 
arguably one of the most robust and consequential 
policy initiatives undertaken by CoGTA of late, speaks 
A fourth suggestion is for national and provincial government to 
implement the constitutional provisions on intervention into failing 
municipalities more robustly.
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However, this provision has never been used. Yet, 
there have been many cases of municipalities 
collapsing spectacularly, leaving communities bearing 
the brunt of all-out service delivery failures. There is 
a further pernicious consequence of the inadequate 
oversight by national and provincial governments. 
Bulk service providers simply pull the plug on an 
errant municipality and thereby punish the entire 
municipality, including all its residents, business 
and industries. In the absence of provincial and 
national governments putting municipalities under 
the ‘business rescue’ envisaged by the Constitution, 
providers of bulk services to the municipality (such as 
ESKOM and the Department of Water Affairs) have 
started reducing or disconnecting services. Therefore, 
instead of the errant municipality’s senior leadership 
losing authority, all residents (including those who 
paid for their services) suffer service cuts. This is not 
what the Constitution intended when it provided for 
a robust intervention regime to protect communities 
from municipal failures.
The fifth suggestion is for national government 
to be more careful in managing its local government 
reform agenda. The argument here is that perennial 
restructuring debates are not good for local 
government. Take, for example, the debate about 
provinces. For as long as we have had provinces, we 
have been discussing whether or not to abolish them. 
The same applies to district municipalities,  
who have been on the chopping block for the past 
fifteen years. Another example is the electricity 
restructuring debate. For at least a decade, 
government’s clearly stated intention was to remove 
the electricity function from municipalities. A bill 
was passed and institutions created to make this 
happen, until eventually the idea was abandoned. 
The point of these examples is not to debate their 
merits or demerits. For each of them, there are 
arguments in favour and against. The point is that 
government must consider the impact that raising 
institutional reform questions has on those very 
institutions that are the subject of the debate. For 
example, it is no secret that during the years that 
national government was mulling over the electricity 
question, many municipalities stopped investing in 
electricity infrastructure. Why invest in a function that 
will be taken away from you, right? Similarly, how 
good is it for the institutional resilience of a district 
municipality when its abolition is on the agenda for 
more than ten years? It is suggested that national 
government should be intentional, clear and decisive 
about structural reforms. The abolition, restructuring 
or disempowering of institutions may be a wise policy 
option in given circumstances. However, they should 
not be made to hang endlessly above institutions as 
the proverbial Sword of Damocles.
The above five suggestions are by no means 
a silver bullet that will miraculously solve local 
government’s problems. However, it is hoped that 
they represent a fresh look at some of the problems 
besetting municipalities. Communities across South 
Africa are signalling that patience is running out. 
Governance in municipalities must improve. At the 
same time, the inter-governmental system on which 
municipalities depend, must improve.
The point is that government must consider the impact that raising 
institutional reform questions has on those very institutions that are the 
subject of the debate.
